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801, 12th ARMY GROUP
APO 655

24 June 1945

SUBJECT: MOUNT Operation

TO: Chief, I-2, Germany

1. 1 June 1945 with Sp 1c (X) Alton G. ADAMS, USN, and Corp. Hugh MONTGOMERY, AUS, I left Wiesbaden to begin the MOUNT operation. At Munich, HEUNTEUFFEL and MORAVOSIK were taken from the IO at Freising to accompany us. 2 June we arrived at Steyring.

2. From 3 June we attempted all scheduled radio contacts with the Rumanian, Hungarian and Yugoslav nets. 4 June contact was successful with Bucharest, and the following message sent: "After overcoming all difficulties, normal traffic will be resumed." QRX was made for the 5th of June at which time Bucharest told us "To verify the genuineness of your messages, you must properly address and sign them, as well as continuing all previous formalities."

3. The same day Bucharest was heard, and a message sent by Central saying: "After overcoming all difficulties, work is again possible as before. Intensification of reports and further expansion possible. Come as often as possible on the previously decided times. Reports soonest about the most important events of the last four weeks. In addition, please tell the KARAI family, 3rd District, Miklos Street 15, that Greti is well and with us. Best wishes, your Hans." Greti refers to Grete KARAI, who is the fiancée of the W/T operator, Hans MORAVOSIK.

4. GIC Detachment of the 80th Inf. Div. had already been advised of our presence in the area, but to perfect our clearance, I went on June 6th to the CP of the 80th at Pocklabrunn, and there explained our presence and mission to the Ass't. G-2. This was followed by a conference on 8 June with the G-2, who gave us his complete approval.

5. In view of the Bucharest message of 5 June, we had to stall until AUNER could be brought down from Freising. Therefore on 6 June we sent: "Because of technical difficulties, traffic will be suspended until 9 June." 6 June AUNER arrived and supplied the necessary "formalities", so that on 9 June we were able to send the following: "As a counter-sign give the starting place of the whole trip on the 22nd of June 1944 to Romania, as well as the make of the vehicle. Notice new traffic time starting with the 10th of June: 1500 hours Middle European Time." The message was addressed "For Bob", and signed "Good by, Mister".

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6. 10 June I was recalled to Munich where I was advised by Col. BERDING that Gen. DONOVAN, in conference with Col. BERDING and Maj. OAKES, authorized the continuance of the MOUNT operation only for counter-espionage purposes. Any attempt to secure positive intelligence through the net was expressly prohibited.

7. The same day at Steyrling Budapest had been contacted, and the following message sent: "Dear Pista: Tell us the most convenient traffic times for you which will make reception possible here often. You can still hear me on the following frequencies: QSY 2 - 4,850 kcs., QSY 3 - 5,300 kcs. Starting with our next traffic there will be a change of call signs: I will call OIR, you will call HRA. Your Hans." At this time Budapest sent its first message: "Dear Hans: I had already thought you had been silenced permanently, and only by chance did I hear you. The situation here is very difficult. Everyone's identity is being checked very closely. You can get everything you want, but the prices are very high. The deportees are now coming back. The hate against the Nazis is very great. Many members of the Freilichtslager party have been sentenced and executed. K."

8. 11 June Bucharest sent us a message which at first was found to be undecipherable, but later was worked out. This said: "To Mister: Starting place Berlin. Make of the vehicle Mercedes-Benz. First overnight stop was Lebonitz. Second was Budapest with motor trouble. I request briefing from you as to the situation there as to your capabilities for activity because of the similar inquiries from you. Where are Willy and Kurt? Are you in contact with Mihai? Bob." This message was then paraphrased and repeated by Bucharest on the 13th of June in the following form: "Counter-sig starting point Berlin. Make of the vehicle Mercedes-Benz. First stopping place Lebonitz. Second Budapest, reached with motor trouble. Question: Do you have contact with MIHAI? Where are Willy and Kurt? Request information as to your new position and capabilities for activity for the same reasons. Request change of operators at Central, because traffic with his knowledge is made very difficult, as a result of being too long and too dangerous for the radio man at this end. Bob." On the same day we sent: "For Bob: Afternoon traffic is difficult because of atmospheric disturbances, so that starting with today traffic will be shifted to 2000 hours Eastern European Time, as proposed by you. In case of negative results, traffic will revert automatically to 1600 hours Eastern European Time. Request that you give us counter-proposals. Avoid clear text and giving times in the clear. Are there any other frequencies that you can use? (The following message was sent as a second message shortly after the transmission of the first half). The situation here is good, but not completely clear. Instructions follow shortly. Kurt is here. Willy sick. Expect a meeting with him in the next few days. Good by, Mister."

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9. 15 June Central sent the 5th message to Bucharest: "because of repairs in the Central, traffic cannot be resumed until 20 June at 2000 hours Eastern European Time. Inform us as to the range of your reception especially to the lower frequencies. Can you receive on 6150 kcs. (equals QBY 2)? The question of an operator will be taken care of. Good by, Mister."

10. Meanwhile AUNER, NEUNTHOFFER, and the secretary, KOCHS, had conferred with me on numerous occasions. The networks in Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia had been discussed at some length and reports were prepared giving the details of the net. Personality lists were also prepared giving the backgrounds and identities of the personnel involved.

11. The next contact with Budapest on 17 June brought the second message from them. The message was as follows: "Dear Hans: Greti's family has already been visited by me. They were very happy. Her mother was worried about her absence. Greetings and kisses. Greti's return home is eagerly awaited. I will definitely come every Sunday, and Tuesday and Saturday if possible. I request that you listen for me on these days. Recently I have been very busy, working day and night. Pista." No further contact has been made since then with the Hungarian station.

12. The Bucharest traffic continued and 20 June Central sent the following message: "Dear Bob: As a result of long interruption and the destruction of facilities here, we have no clear picture of your activity. We request therefore, a report about your personal situation. Where are Jim, Jonny, Fern, Klein, and the others? Do you have contact with them? Is your net still capable of action? What plans do you have, including any suggestions you have? Greetings. Good by, Mister." Bucharest replied on 21 June with: "Personal situation unchanged. Position of the organization (is the) Resistance Movement: Officers and men, as well as elements of the German Volksguppe are put up partly in camps, partly in villages, and they are already organized and ready for a unit. The same holds true for the Iron Guardists. Armament is weak. Radio apparatus is lacking, because the equipment you sent went astray as you know. Net is completely intact and capable of action. Contact with the Province is only by courier. The Iron Guardists are awaiting instructions from Mihai. Contact with Maniu, Rodesa (?), and ALDEKIS established. Jim and Jonny have disappeared since March. Inquiries as to their whereabouts are without result. Recommendation about the method of the unit, after receiving your instructions as to your intentions is possible. Bob." On the 22nd of June the following traffic details were sent by Bucharest: "Range of my reception of my apparatus is from 8,600 kcs. to 4,200 kcs. Tell me which frequencies you will use and also under what number I can ask for them. Bauer."

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13. 25th June Central again contacted Bucharest, and transmitted the 7th message: "To Bauer. In addition to known frequency, Central also sends on the following frequencies:

6,150 kcs. equals QSY 2
5,720 kcs. equals QSY 3
7,380 kcs. equals QSY 4
7,760 kcs. equals QSY 5

Can you send on any other frequencies than the one you are now using? Central."

14. 23 June the main transmitter started to go bad. A fuse blew out and thereafter the output dropped off from 250 to 40 watts. As yet we have been unable to repair the set, but have since 24 June made our contacts with the 100 Watt spare transmitter. Thus far it has been adequate.

15. During the period of our operations in the area of Steyr-ling, many problems of clearance and liaison have arisen. It is unnecessary to discuss these in detail; suffice it to say that after initial difficulties have been overcome, good relations were established with all local headquarters and authorities. These included the 80th Inf. Div., the 11th Armd. Div., the 101st Airborne Div., AMG at Kirchdorf, the Burgomeister at Klaus, and the Free Austrian Movement. Cover stories were designed to fit each situation and the nature of the group or office making the inquiry. The idea is locally accepted that we are employing SD personnel (all of whom were known in the region prior to our arrival) to assist in running down the few remaining Nazi bigwigs still at large.

16. In reply to London's statement that a control sign "SIO" had been sent from the Central, it may be flatly stated that such is not true. London probably misread the letters "SSD", with which some of the early transmissions were begun.

17. Capt. TILM's arrival 25 June with the SI questionnaire and oral instructions to transmit it has placed me in a very difficult position. I was instructed in Munich that the operation was to be strictly limited to an exploitation of its GE aspects. This questionnaire, however, commits us irrevocably to a positive rather than a negative line of action. In view of General DONOVAN's expressed desire to turn all of this over to the Russians, it is difficult to see how this can be ever fulfilled once we have asked the questions submitted by SI. In view of this inconsistency of directions coupled with the very serious possibilities inherent in such an undertaking, I request

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that I be provided with written instructions before any of the SI questions are transmitted from the Central at Steyrling.

18. It is my belief that both the organization and the direction of American Intelligence agencies are inadequate for the successful operation of these networks as a serious effort to penetrate Russian occupied territory. However, I do not believe it will be in American interests to destroy, by handing it over to Russia, the net. In Rumania, at least, it can function without assistance or direction from this side. My recommendation is that it be allowed to do just that. Key personnel now in our hands could be disposed of through the IC at Freising, some allowance being made for the offer which they have made. The Central can be easily dismantled. Unless we are sure to eliminate forever all personnel involved thus far, a double-cross such as that contemplated in the plan to turn over all the information to the Russians would eventually become known, and would possibly result in the alienation of most of those well-placed political elements in Rumania and Hungary who are tied into this net, and who now seem so favorably disposed towards the United States. We would thus lose potential friends without realizing any gain commensurate with such a loss; for all that we could hope for by such a move would be gratitude and appreciation from a government which has heretofore never displayed much of either.

W.B. BROWNE
Capt., SCI

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